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A B S T R A C T 
The extensive research on cross-border mergers and acquisitions performed in different institutional 
settings shows that legal and regulatory infrastructure, level of investor protection, and key 
macroeconomic factors are the most important determinants. With this in mind, we analyze and discuss 
the telecommunications market leader Vodafone’s cross-border acquisition of Hutchison equity stake in 
CGP Investments, which had long-time delayed (litigated) in an Asian emerging market‒India‒in the view 
of corporate gains tax. Regarding theory testing and development, we test six theories propounded in 
management-related literature. Further, based on limitations of the existing theories we develop new 
theory‒Farmers Fox Theory‒and offer lawful propositions for future research that would advance the 
current international business and institutional knowledge. We therefore conclude that a given country’s 
weak regulatory system benefits both the acquirer and the target firm; simultaneously, this behavior would 
adversely affect on economic/fiscal income of a nation. 
 
© 2013 xxxxxxxx. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.   
 
1. Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions are possibly the most aggressive strategic 
organizational response to resource dependence [1]. Indeed, foreign 
merger or acquisition is a potential mode of entry into a global market. 
Further, an acquisition involves transfer of an asset between two owners 
of different countries who are taxed differently. By and large, a great 
amount of overseas investment crop up in the outward appearance of 
acquisitions [2]. For example, number of world foreign mergers or 
acquisitions has been increased from 23% of total volume in 1998 to 45% 
in 2007 [3]. In particular, number of deals (deal value) of word economy 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (hereinafter, CB-M&As) has 
increased from 1,582 (US$21.09 billion) in 1991 to 7,018 (US$1,022.72 
billion) in 2007 at a massive growth rate 344% (4,748%), and thereafter 
sharply declined to 5,769 (US$525.88 billion) in 2011 because of recent 
© 2014 Holy Spirit University of Kaslik. Hosting by Elsevier B.V.   .
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global financial crisis.1 The main drivers of these CB-M&A waves are 
being globalization, technological innovation, bull financial market, 
deregulation, and privatization [9].   
A country’s governance system, constitutional framework, legal 
environment, trust and relationship, and culture play a key role in 
international negations, and their ex-ante and ex-post accounting earnings 
[10,11,12]. For example, in [10,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20] the authors 
show that legal framework, level of investor protection, cross-culture, 
corporate governance system, financial markets environment and quality 
of accounting standards are important factors while making deals 
triumphant, and the same factors could affect firm’s value and 
profitability. In addition, a country’s macroeconomic factors, such as, 
gross domestic product (GDP), tax system and tax incentives, exchange 
rate, and inflation rate likely to be influenced the border-crossing mergers 
or acquisitions [21,22,23,24,25]. More importantly, local political events 
could affect foreign direct investments for both the inbound and outbound 
flows [26,27,28]. In some instances, physical distance also plays a role in 
international investments [29]. 
However, many emerging markets (EMs) have failed to show a 
good governance system in several international trade activities, 
especially foreign direct investments (FDIs) and cross-border acquisitions. 
For instance, Indian government has been utterly failed to take an 
appropriate action in FDI proposals (e.g. retail market, telecom sector), 
and CB-M&A deals. 2  For example, Vodafone and other multinational 
giants in different sectors from different nations were badly experienced 
to the put forth of regulatory authorities’ peculiar guidelines. In fact, it is 
being a “stranger in a strange land” [30].  
With this in mind, we outline our objective, and contribution to the 
international business (IB) literature. We thus emphasize on tax litigation 
in cross-border deals that is attached with Indian government. In 
particular, we show India’s CB-M&A market during 2000-2011, case 
background, and case analysis and discussions. Regarding theory testing 
and development, we test six theories propounded in management-related 
literature (theory of foreign direct investment, eclectic paradigm, Uppsala 
theory of firm internationalization, liability of foreignness, institutional 
theory, and information asymmetry theory). Based on limitations of 
existing theories, we develop a theory in light of regulatory framework – 
Farmers Fox Theory – that would advance existing IB knowledge; also 
offer some important propositions for new research. The selection of 
words ‘Farmers’ and ‘Fox’ are stubborn, hence they are purposeful that 
similar to Dunning’s view [31]. 
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 outlines 
the extensive literature on CB-M&As. Section 3 explains the method. 
Section 4 shows India’s CB-M&As market and regulatory framework. 
Section 5 presents case information. Section 6 discusses point and 
counterpoint of the given case. In Section 7, we test various business 
theories, and propose a new theory and offer lawful propositions. Section 
8 concludes the paper. 
 
 
 
 
1 See [4,5,6]. 
2  For instance, in [7], authors show a delayed oil and petroleum deal between 
Vedanta and UK’s Cairn Energy; on the other hand, a broken telecom deal between 
India’s Bharti Airtel and South Africa’s MTN [8]. 
2. Review of related literature on CB-M&As: A law and 
governance perspective 
Given the outstanding backdrop to the study, we have reviewed the 
studies that ranging from a macroeconomic determinant to a firm-specific 
determinant of CB-M&As. We therefore outline the review of literature in 
two schools. First, it presents the extensive contributions on various 
factors, which determine foreign investments and cross-country 
acquisitions. Second, it draws a set of synopsis from the most relevant 
determinant of taxation in foreign mergers. 
2.1. Review of studies related to foreign investment and M&A deals 
Corporate structures create superior value to the firm when it has 
multinationalized [32]. Thus, a global expansion strategy is likely to 
be appealed by two essential channels, namely foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) and M&As. It is evidenced that these channels 
influence [favourable/unfavourable] by numerous economic, political, 
legal and so forth of institutional factors. For instance, regarding the 
effect of political events on FDIs in Germany and Japan, German 
firms invest in less advanced-economies; conversely, internal political 
conflicts in the host countries of the less advanced-world adversely 
affect foreign investments. On the other hand, intergovernmental 
networks or relationships, and relative weight of economic 
environment are important key factors in determining border-crossing 
investments by Japanese firms [27,28]. 
In [33] authors argue that strength (weakness) of a legal 
framework would influence international investments. In other words, 
mergers or acquisitions (volume) may increase and target firms 
improve their efficiency after merging with a company established in 
countries where a stronger investor protection offers [20]. In fact, 
target firm usually adopts the accounting standards, disclosure 
practices, and governance structures of the acquiring firm [13]. 
Further, it describes that when there is no formal change of the 
domestic legal system, firms in a country may adopt different levels 
of investor protection, depending on the firms they merge. 
Furthermore, acquiring firms pay a higher premium for targets from 
countries with a weak regulatory setting or less institutional 
environment because of significant asymmetric information and 
agency issues [12,19,34].  
In [15] the author finds that financial variables and other 
institutional factors play a crucial job in both inbound and outbound 
capital flows. Thus, size of financial markets is one of the 
determinants when a domestic enterprise invests or acquires a firm 
abroad. The author estimations indicate that a 1% rise of the stock 
market to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.955% increase in CB-
M&As activity. In case of U.S. foreign acquisitions, bidding firms 
benefit from mergers or acquisitions take place in economies with a 
worse or weak financial markets regulatory setting [17]. In other 
words, it states that stronger the financial regulatory system, and 
therefore bidder firm shareholders should experience positive returns, 
or else, weak (negative) [12]. More recently, a study shows that 
bidder firms of targets based in civil-law nations have outperformed 
to the deals based in common-law nations. It also suggests that 
buying a firm in economies where higher restrictions on capital 
mobility could add premium to the acquiring firm shareholders' 
wealth [10]. Similarly, geography or territory, quality of accounting 
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disclosure and bilateral trade determinants raise the likelihood of 
M&As between two economies. Further, valuation is one of the key 
motives of foreign mergers, for instance, firms in countries whose 
capital market in terms of value and currency have augmented, and 
that has a significant market-to-book value tend to be acquirers, and 
targets otherwise [3]. 
In a related study, authors investigate the impact of country’s 
legal, cultural, and business environment factors, industry factors as 
well as deal specific factors on the intensity of cross-border joint 
ventures. They suggest that U.S. firms are more likely to form joint 
ventures with firms from countries that have weak legal and 
regulatory setting [18]. For banking mergers, acquirers are typically 
from countries with lesser regulations, stronger guidelines for foreign 
bank entry, lesser restrictions on bank activities, and with established 
deposit insurance schemes. It observes that severe laws of the 
banking sector in the target economy likely cause a decline in the 
number of foreign mergers or acquisitions [35]. 
In addition, physical distance could increase the cost of merger 
or combination [29 In 3]. In other words, CB-M&A activities of Latin 
American region are positively affected by the economic freedom and 
business conditions in target country [23]. Likewise, a country’s 
GDP, exchange rate, and interest rate are likely to influence a local 
enterprise while buying a firm in other economies [25]. More 
specifically, a study explores a link between exchange rates and FDIs. 
It develops a model where the assets acquired in an acquisition are 
easily moveable within the firm, thus able to produce returns in any 
currency [11 In 22]. Indeed, a currency movements is one the 
important determinants of foreign M&As [3]. In [22] author shows 
that exchange rate is one of the key determinants for inbound-FDI to 
the U.S. economy but not for inbound-FDI to other developed 
markets. On the other hand, culture is one of the determinants of 
border-crossing investments or acquisitions. In the merger of Telia–
Telenor failure case, it observes that historical sentiments, feelings, 
and emotions are some of the significant variables that would damage 
cross-cultural business models (if ignored) [16]. Likewise, cultural 
distance between two countries and political uncertainty has linked 
inversely with cross-border acquisitions [14].  
In sum, we argue that a nation’s macroeconomic factors, for 
instance, GDP, exchange rate, bilateral trade relations and interest 
rate; and financial system and regulatory setting issues, for example, 
level of investor protection and quality of accounting standards – 
would influence border-crossing mergers or acquisitions. We also 
realize that political events and governmental relationships play a 
vital job in FDI inflows (outflows).   
2.2. Review of studies related to Taxation as a determinant in 
overseas M&A deals 
Taxation is likely a motive for merger waves, in which the author 
suggests a model of shareholder behaviour under the principles of 
double taxation [36]. In addition to the case of political stability, the 
established tax system is one of the key factors that make a nation 
investment friendly or hostile [26]. Indeed, some school of scholars 
explains that ‘tax advantage’ is one of the major motives behind these 
deals. By contrast, a country’s financial markets legal infrastructure, 
banking guidelines, taxation issues and political events would 
adversely affect these deals, especially global direct investments and 
foreign acquisitions [3,13,20,23,27,28).  
In [2] the authors suggest that tax subsidies or exemption 
schemes are constructive if ownership advantage is a public good 
within the foreign MNE. As of Nigeria case, it ascertains that 
multiple tax schemes reduce incentives to pay tax or for voluntary 
compliance; in an adverse manner, the current Nigerian system does 
not motivate taxpayers while inducing voluntary compliance [26]. 
However, when we look over different countries taxation 
structures there are two types of tax systems, such as, single taxation 
and double taxation. For instance, double taxation comes in the form 
of non-resident dividend withholding taxes, and parent country 
corporate income’ taxation of repatriated dividends. It also suggests 
that foreign country tax schemes greatly influence the outcome of 
border-crossing acquisitions [37]. In other words, the parent-
subsidiary investment establishing a firm supported by foreign 
acquisition is greatly affected by the double taxation. Similarly, 
location decisions of M&A investments have less influenced to 
differences in tax rates compared to location decisions of Greenfield 
investments [21].  
On the other hand, tax evasions would adversely affect fiscal or 
government revenue that obstructs the timely implementation of 
economic policies and programs. More notably, it has been noticed 
that larger differences in corporate income tax rates attract foreign 
investment [3]. In [38], the authors find the mean rate of tax evasion 
is about 16%, which infers that the incentives for tax evasion do not 
reduce when the firms are publicly listed.  
In sum, we draw a fact that ‘a country’s tax policies, tax 
structure, and tax incentives and schemes’ play a major role in 
border-crossing merger or acquisition deals. By contrast, we strongly 
contend that tax evasion would be more where there is a book law of 
double taxation or high international tax rates. 
 
3. Method: Case study research 
Qualitative research allows the researcher to discover new variables and 
relationships, to reveal and understand complex processes, and to 
illustrate the influence of the social context [39:1824]. It is a powerful tool 
for management researchers, which provides a great deal of merits beyond 
what traditional survey methods can provide [39:1830]. For example, 
theory testing is a great deal of contribution that improves the quality of a 
given field [40:39]. Given the purpose and the type of synopsis of our 
study, we have chosen a well-established qualitative method “Case Study 
Research” (CSR). Professor Yin defines that “a case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clear evident, and it relies on multiple sources of evidence” 
[41:13]. In fact, the biggest contributions come from bold, novel theory-
building efforts that push the research frontiers by fully utilizing the 
theoretically unique context of IB [42:543]. In particular, a study designs 
a typology of theorizing that suggests four forms, namely contextualized 
explanation, inductive theory-building, interpretive sense-making and 
natural experiment [43]. More recently, an author proposes that when the 
emphasis on theory development is strong and the emphasis on 
contextualization is weak there would be stronger “theory building and 
testing” [44]. 
Thus, our paper falls into three categories, namely testing the 
existing theories, developing a theory, and offering propositions. To do 
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so, we have chosen single case study, and compare and discuss the 
similarities of this case with other two cases that have associated with the 
given economic setting. In fact, CSR can be used on single case or 
multiple cases that varies from researcher to researcher, because it 
depends on the purpose of research whether theory is testing or theory is 
developing [41]. Hence, single case is suitable when it satisfy all the 
guidelines for theory(ies) testing, or developing a new theory [45]. 
Regarding data, we have chosen a method of archival data. Thus, 
archival data can be used independently as well, particularly when 
attempting to understand historical incidents, or economic/social systems 
[39:1829]. The sources of our data are as follows. The deal information is 
collected from India’s registered national finance dailies, namely The 
Economic Times, The Hindu Business Line, Business Standard and The 
Financial Express, and finance and legal consultants like BMR Advisors, 
Deloitte, and KPMG. More importantly, we accumulate the essence of the 
given case, and business profile and financial information from the 
respective ‘Company Annual Reports’. 
 
4. India’s CB-M&As market and regulatory framework 
4.1. India’s CB-M&A market during 2000‒11 
We provide some highlights of India’s foreign acquisition transactions in 
terms of purchases and sales for the period 2000‒11 (see Figure 1). Thus, 
foreign acquisitions in terms of sales (number of deals and deal value) 
have been increased significantly compared to purchases (same as 
aforesaid). In fact, one can also observe that the year 2007 has shown a 
great amount of investment-flow, for example, purchases are appreciably 
higher than sales. From this finding, we infer that both Indian local 
companies and MNEs have internationalized their operations through 
foreign mergers or acquisitions since 2005. At the same time, DMNEs 
have been taken-over local firms majorly through FDIs and substantial 
acquisition of shares. In this regard, we argue that “this is possible 
because the Indian government had amended many regulations including 
FDI norms during 2005‒2006”. The other important findings are as 
follows: total number of deals (deal value) for purchases and sales has 
reached 1,122 (US$47.97 billion), and 1,052 (US$88.93 billion), 
respectively. Conversely, averages likely show for purchases (number of 
deals 87.67; deal value US$7,410 million), and sales (same as aforesaid, 
93.5; US$4,000 million). Therefore, this noteworthy finding infers that 
most domestic firms have preferred merger or acquisition as one of their 
corporate strategies both for internationalizing their trade and for gaining 
ownership advantages. Similarly, outbound acquisitions average growth 
rate is significantly higher than inbound acquisitions. For instance, we 
have seen ample of rise in purchases (number of deals 38%; deal value 
1030%) compared to sales (same as aforesaid, 16%; 80%). More 
importantly, we observe similar findings when Indian share is measured 
as a percentage of world economy. In other words, purchases in terms of 
number of deals as a percentage of world economy are notably higher than 
sales for the period 2005‒2008 and 2010. Indeed, we have not found 
significant difference between purchases and sales. However, purchases in 
terms of deal value as a percentage of world economy is higher than sales 
(1.40 > 0.87). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 - India’s cross-border mergers and acquisitions during 2000-11. 
Source: Authors plot a graph based on data extracted from the UNCTAD Statistics 
refer to worldwide foreign direct investments, and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. 
4.2. The M&As regulatory framework 
The India’s M&A regulatory framework comprises five government 
authorities, namely the Registrar of Companies (Companies Act, 1956), 
the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI – SAS&T Regulations, 
1997), the Competition Commission of India (CCI ‒ Competition Act, 
2002), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), and the Department of Revenue 
(Income Tax Act, 1961).3 In particular, RBI plays a key role in banking 
and finance related mergers, alliances or combinations. Apart from the 
above controllers, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) 
performs an important role in FDI approvals and foreign trade 
transactions. There are some other acts, which perform directly and 
indirectly related to both domestic and foreign deals that include Foreign 
Exchange Management Act, 1999; Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Registration 
Act, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Wealth Tax Act, 1957; and 
Customs Act, 1962. Hence, most of these regulations are exercised by the 
Department of Revenue under the Ministry of Finance. 
 
5. Case information 
5.1. Profile of Vodafone Group Plc 
Vodafone Group is the UK-based multinational telecom enterprise, which 
offers a range of communications' products and services include voice, 
messaging, data and fixed-line solutions, and instruments [46]. According 
to the Financial Times Global 500 ranking for the year 2012, it has ranked 
36th declined from 30th in 2011. Further, it is next to China’s China 
Mobile in the worldwide telecommunications industry. 4  It operates in 
three geographic markets, namely Europe, Africa and Central Europe, 
Asia Pacific and the Middle East. By and large, the company’s global 
presence in terms of number of markets (number of mobile customers) has 
increased dramatically at three-fold (35-fold) from 12 (5.8 million) in 
1998 to 38 (206.4 million) in 2007, and thereafter, augmented to 40 
(370.9 million) in 2011 [48,49,50]. It is listed primarily on the London 
 
 
 
3 To conserve space, we do not present all regulations in detailed, however they are 
available upon request. 
4 Source: [47]. 
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Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1988 and the second listing on NASDAQ. As of 
May 16, 2011, it has a market capitalization approximately £86.4 billion 
making is the second largest listing in the Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) 100 index, and the 28th largest MNE in the world 
[50:134]. In 2000, it has acquired Germany’s Mannesmann for US$231 
billion, which was the biggest deal in Vodafone’s corporate history [51]. 
In the light of financials, it has shown impressive results during 2008-
2012. For instance, total revenue (profit) has improved (recovered) 
appreciably from £26.68 billion (£6.52 billion) in 2005 to £29.35 billion 
(−£21.82 billion) in 2006, £31.1 billion (−£5.3 billion) in 2007, £45.9 
billion (£7.87 billion) in 2011, and £46.47 billion (£7 billion) in 2012 
[46,48,49,50]. 
Regarding Indian operations, Vodafone has acquired an additional 
22% equity stake in Vodafone India Limited5 (VIL) from its joint venture 
partner ‘Essar Group’ for £2.6 billion on July 1, 2011 [50:56]. Further, 
Essar Group has sold their remaining 11% equity interest in VIL to 
Piramal Healthcare for £767 million during the financial year 2011-2012. 
As of March 31, 2012, Vodafone has a 64.4% interest in VIL through its 
wholly owned subsidiaries, and a further 20.1% indirect holding giving an 
aggregate 84.5% equity interest [50:118].       
5.2. Profile of Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
The Hong Kong based and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed MNE’ 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) is a conglomerate and an 
investment holding group. According to the Financial Times Global 500 
ranking, it has ranked 150th for the year 2011, and then down to 167 in 
2012; further, it ranks fifth in sector ranking of ‘General Industrials’.6 The 
multinational business entrepreneur - Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong 
Holdings has 49.9% equity interest in HWL; in fact, he solely chairs both 
the firms [52]. HWL business operations include property and hotels, 
ports and related services, energy, infrastructure, retail, finance and 
investments, and telecommunications, as well. In addition, it is also a 
container terminal operator. In the light of financials, the HWL results are 
worth mentioning during 2002-2011. For example, total revenue (profit, 
total assets) has boosted substantially from HK$75.24 billion (HK$11.77 
billion, HK$498.44 billion) in 2002 to HK$218.68 billion (HK$33.35 
billion, HK$790.34 billion) in 2007, and HK$233.7 billion (HK$56 
billion, HK$720.54 billion(↓)) in 2011 [53].     
The HWL’s subsidiary-firm Hutchison Telecommunications 
International Limited (HTIL) was floated in 2004 to carry out a set of 
fixed-wire and mobile assets in eight countries, namely Hong Kong, India, 
Israel, Macau, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Paraguay, and Thailand [52:20]. 
Nevertheless, it appears that HTIL reported profits of almost HK$67 
billion in 2007 although this is primarily due to the sale of company's 
operations in India to Vodafone for HK$69.3 billion [52:29]. It is worth 
noting that HTIL has invested roughly US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 
[51]. In this regard, one can estimate that Li Ka-shing has outstandingly 
gained about US$8.3 billion for the period of stay 1995 through 2006. 
While, the Indian-listed entity, Hutch-Essar Limited (HEL) is a 
joint venture between CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited, which is 
 
 
 
5 On October 11, 2011, the firm name (VIL) has changed from a joint venture called 
Vodafone-Essar Limited (VEL). 
6 Source: [47]. 
indirectly owned by the HTIL and the Indian conglomerate firm Essar 
Group. In 1995, the Hutchison was launched its mobile operations; 
subsequently, the acquisitions of other mobile operators gained the 
territory market advantage of Hutchison Max. In January 2006, it had 
acquired BPL Mobile Cellular then the network expanded to 23 circles 
[52:23–24].  
5.3. Time-line of the Vodafone–Hutchison deal 
Vodafone-Hutchison cross-country telecom deal is one of the world’s 
longtime-delayed cross-border M&As (see Figure 2 and Box 1). As far as 
the case is concerned, Vodafone Group has an offshore subsidiary unit 
Vodafone International Holdings B.V (VIH) located in the Netherlands. 
On the other hand, HWL has an on-shore Asian subsidiary firm HTIL 
headquartered in Hong Kong; thus, HTIL has 100% equity holdings in 
CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited located in Cayman Islands. Indeed, 
both MNEs have significant equity interest in their respective subsidiaries. 
The case is that “CGP owns a 51.95% indirect shareholding in HEL, an 
Indian-listed entity [49]. The crux of the case is that “Vodafone had 
agreed (completed) on February 11 (May 8), 2007 to buy a HTIL’s 100% 
holdings in CGP Investments through its subsidiary firm VIH for US$10.9 
billion [49,54]. Certainly, there was some debt amount approximately 
US$2 billion that included in the deal amount [51]. Then, the acquisition 
has resulted in Vodafone’s control over CGP and its subsidiaries 
including HEL [55]. Surprisingly, the Indian tax authorities had issued a 
notice to Vodafone, inducing it as an assesse-in-default for failure to 
withhold taxes on gains arising out of HTILs transfer of shares of CGP 
Investments [55]. Subsequently, the issue had litigated for longtime before 
the BHC and the SC [56]. Finally, on January 20, 2012, SC has given a 
landmark judgment in favor of Vodafone, stating that the deal had no 
connection with territory of the country, and therefore, tax authorities 
have no right to impose any capital gains tax [57]. 
 
6. Systemic analysis of the case – point and counterpoint 
We thus start our discussion from the basic Indian Contract Act, 1872 to 
the recent Competition Act, 2002 (see Figure 3). First, did any contract 
exhibit between Vodafone’s VIH and Hutchison Whampoa’s HTIL? Our 
straightforward answer is ‘yes’, because the contract titled ‘share purchase 
agreement’ had occurred within the nature of, for instance, Section 2(a), 
(b), (d), (e), (h) and Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Second, 
where did the contract register? According to Hutchison Whampoa and 
Vodafone' Annual Reports [49,54,58], the contract has registered outside 
the territory of India, namely Cayman Islands. To argue this observation, 
we then deeply study the relevant acts like Transfer of Property Act, 1882; 
Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Registration Act, 1908; Sections 390-394 of 
Companies Act, 1956; Wealth Tax Act, 1957; Customs Act, 1962; 
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; Monopolies and Restrictive 
Trade Practices Act, 1969 (now, Competition Act, 2002); and other valid 
amendments occurred in 2006; nevertheless, we could not find any 
pertinent section or sub-section that explains the geographical or territory 
of India. In addition, we look into the SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations, 1997, 
although no section is relevant to examine this case. 
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Fig. 2 - Structure of Vodafone-Hutchison deal. 
Notes: (1) Hutchison Whampoa’s HTIL has invested indirectly in Hutchison-Essar* 
while having 100% equity holding in CGP Investments, (2) Vodafone’s Vodafone 
International Holdings has acquired HTIL’s 100% equity holdings in CGP 
Investments, and (3) as a result of direct acquisition occurred in Cayman Islands, 
Vodafone become a joint venture partner in India’s Hutchison-Essar. *After the deal, 
Hutchison Essar has been changed to ‘Vodafone Essar’, and thereafter, on October 
11, 2011, it again referred to “Vodafone India Limited” [50]. 
 
With this in mind, we ask our third question. Was the method of 
‘transfer of shares’ between Vodafone and HTIL a direct or an indirect? 
Prior to answer this question, we must acknowledge Vodafone-Hutchison 
(CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited) deal information (see, for 
instance, Figure 2). In this hypothetical picture, we show that the ‘share 
transfer’ has occurred between VIH and HTIL. In fact, both subsidiaries 
have no direct assessment or connection with India. As a result, the deal 
becomes India’s offshore transaction in the view of ‘indirect transfer of 
shares’. In line with discussion, we further check whether Indian Income 
Tax Act, 1961 has any section or provision to levy capital gain tax on 
such indirect transfers when the deal becomes offshore transaction. Here, 
our straightforward answer is ‘no’, but such taxes have been exempted in 
the existing act. In other words, section 47(vi) explains, “where there is a 
transfer of any capital asset in the scheme of amalgamation by an 
amalgamating company to the amalgamated company, such transfer will 
not regarded as a transfer for the purpose of capital gains tax provided the 
company amalgamated company to whom such assets have been 
transferred, is an Indian company” [59]. 
The Vodafone’s counsel had argued that as per section 9(1)(i) of 
the Act, income deemed to accrue or arise in India from the transfer of a 
capital asset ‘situated in India’ should be taxed in India [56]. Conversely, 
it has mentioned that the assumption that the geographical location of 
investment matters for its productivity whereas corporate ownership 
structures do not [2]. Furthermore, “the nexus of a non-resident with the 
taxing jurisdiction arises where the source of income originates in the 
jurisdiction” [60]. While the case was ruling in BHC, we found a relevant 
study by [61:522–524] where the authors suggest that the ‘implicit test of 
nationality or test of protectiveness’ should have been considered and 
evaluated. Hence, the deal has not been attracted the two tests. They also 
presume, “in some advanced countries, withholding tax in case of non-
residents applies only when payments are made by residents to non-
residents”. As a result, SC has given the judgment in favor Vodafone that 
tax authorities have no jurisdiction to impose capital gains taxes on 
offshore deals or indirect transfer of shares. 7  In particular, the court 
further observes that controlling interest is a contractual right and could 
not consider as property [62]. Further, it has terrifically pointed out that 
any judgment should be given with regard to existing law or book of law. 
Lastly, we strongly support the views and judgment given by the apex 
court of India. Four decades ago, Hymer argues that “MNEs, because of 
their size and international connections, have certain flexibility for 
escaping regulations imposed in one country” [63:447]. We thus support 
the views of Hymer in this particular aspect. 
 
Fig. 3 - Systemic analysis of Vodafone-Hutchison deal. 
Notes: VG – Vodafone Group Plc, UK; VIH – Vodafone International Holdings, The 
Netherlands; HW – Hutchison Whampoa Limited, Hong Kong; HTIL – Hutchison 
Telecommunications International Limited, Hong Kong; and CGP – CGP 
Investments (Holdings) Limited, Cayman Islands. 
 
7. Theory testing, and theory development and lawful 
propositions 
The outstanding part of this paper aims to test six theories that have 
propounded in management-related literature (see Table 1). Regarding 
theory development and lawful propositions, we establish a triangular 
association between systemic case analysis, relevant CB-M&A literature, 
and theory testing. We therefore define our theory as “Farmers Fox 
Theory”. It reveals that  
“a given country’s weak (loopholes in) financial and tax regulatory 
system benefits both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions based on two assumptions: first, one must have 
some experience in the given economic and regulatory environment or 
some kind of alliance with a local firm; second, other one should new to 
the economy where the target firm registered or associated with. At the 
same time, this economic behaviour adversely affects its fiscal income or 
revenue”.   
In addition, we acknowledge some important limitations that 
should be checked by future scholars before testing this theory. In other 
words, one should receive impartial results in a given economic setting 
based on the assumptions of theory. First, a given study must be within 
 
 
 
7 More importantly, the court held that both Vodafone and Hutchison Whampoa’s 
HTIL were not “fly by night” operators or short-term investors; hence, they had 
contributed substantially Rs. 20,242 crore (US$3.76 billion) in the form of both 
direct and indirect taxes to the exchequer for the period 2003‒2011 [64]. 
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the foreign mergers or acquisitions. Second, the given sample should be 
delayed or broken, or both. Third, there should be a government or state 
involvement (or action) in that delayed or broken deal. Fourth, there 
should not be a conflict of interest between acquirer and target firm. Fifth, 
both the firms can be different each other in business nature. Sixth, either 
the firms can have prior alliance experience or not, which does not 
influence our theory. Seventh, this theory also supports, and in line with 
‘liability of foreignness’ [65]. Eighth, our theory is not feasible to apply 
for domestic transactions; however, we endorse ‘liability of localness’ – 
when a given economy enterprises internationalize their operations or 
seeking to invest in other foreign nations [1]. Finally, the deal can be any 
form - that is either pre-merger negotiations, or during the merger process, 
but should not be a post-merger integration. 
The following propositions would advance the current knowledge 
of foreign acquisitions or alliances. 
  
Proposition 1. A given country’s weak financial markets and tax 
regulatory system benefits both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-
border investments or acquisitions. 
 
Case testimony: Prior to provide case proofs, we define what a weak 
regulatory system is. In a given period, where a country’s regulatory 
system does not advance in line with similar group of countries, or should 
not adopt or amend specific rules and guidelines for a public good, and 
when the system has corrupted by the given political instability and 
bureaucrats inefficiency, thus together leads to delay or break both public 
and business-purpose legal procedures – is called “weak regulatory 
system”. More importantly, this weak system adversely affects 
government’s fiscal income whist benefiting other stakeholders. 
In this case, Vodafone has benefitted in the form of capital gains 
tax that the India’s apex court has given its landmark judgment by stating 
that the existing tax guidelines do not allow tax authorities to impose 
capital gains tax on Vodafone in the current Vodafone-Hutchison deal. As 
a result, Vodafone has benefited approximately 20 per cent on a given 
deal amount (US$10.9 billion), which is equal to US$2.18 billion. On the 
other hand, Hutchison Whampoa benefited in the form of premium value 
that has paid by the Vodafone. In reality, HWL has invested 
approximately US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 and sold to Vodafone 
for US$10.9 billion, which benefited US$8.3 billion, per se. In the 
paradigm of international laws, it is said that only an acquirer is liable to 
pay tax and not the target firm. In sum, both the acquirer and the target 
firm are benefited because of loopholes in the given country’s institutional 
setting. 
 
Proposition 2. Acquirer or merged firm gains new knowledge, acquisition 
experience and other learning proposals while acquiring a target firm 
located in (or associated with) weak legal and regulatory framework. 
 
Case testimony: As a result of long-time delay in judging the given case, 
Vodafone had acquired a great deal of knowledge on a given country’s 
constitutional system, weakness of the regulatory setting, approaching 
public administration authorities and bureaucrats, linkage between 
politicians, bureaucrats, industry associations, jurisdictions, media and 
public, and knowing the given market potential for its survival. Thus, this 
acquisition is a kind of learning experience to DMNEs while entering 
negotiations or doing business in countries like India. If Vodafone could 
advance their deeper eyesight, therefore it would be head of other 
multinational giants in the world economy telecommunications-market. 
Proposition 3-1. Foreign acquisition transactions get delay - when a given 
country adopts developed-economies legal guidelines without cause-
benefit analysis, does not understand and define the actual purpose of the 
acts, does not perform regular amendments, or does amend or not amend 
without any explanation, and lazy public administration, thus together 
form a weak constitutional system, which damages public or social good. 
Proposition 3-2. In cross-country deals, acquiring firms acquisition cost 
increases coherently, for instance, communication cost, legal proceedings 
cost and other associated costs because of a given country’s regulatory 
authorities exerts, behaviour and dealings. 
Proposition 3-3. The increased acquisition cost (total acquisition cost − 
actual transaction value) would adversely affect acquiring firm’s stock 
returns and accounting earnings. 
 
Case testimony: To the best of our knowledge, it is one of the worst long-
time delayed cross-country deals in the world economy, especially in 
telecommunications sector. The deal had initiated in December 2006, 
announced in the media in February 2007, completed in May 2007, tax 
authorities filed a petition in the given country’s state jurisdiction [...] and 
finally, SC given its judgment in January 2012 (see Box 1 for time line of 
the deal). In sum, number of months that the transaction has consumed in 
the account of Vodafone approximately 62. Hence, we could support 
some case proofs with the theory ‘liability of foreignness’ [65]. 
Conversely, we substantiate our proposition (3-1 to 3-3) from the 
recent foreign acquisition deals that associated with the given country. 
First, Bharti Airtel wanted to acquire or merge with South African-based 
MTN Group. Thus, this deal had delayed and then cancelled during three-
round negotiations (2008-2009) because of regulatory hurdles, which 
should be authorized by the SEBI and the Ministry of Finance. For 
instance, the hurdles refer to dual listing norms and complex deal structure 
[8]. In fact, the reality of the case lies here “the given country’s regulatory 
system does not define what dual listing is”. In this regard, one should 
raise different blended questions, for instance, when a given country owns 
an Asia’s oldest stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange established in 
1875), becomes an independent country in 1947, implemented new 
economic policy in 1991, and most financial regulations have amended in 
1994 and 2006; though, why this country’s legal framework does not have 
guidelines for dual listing or any other specific acts. Second, this is an 
interesting deal between UK-based Vedanta Resources and UK-origin 
Cairn Energy. It looks similar to the current case. Thus, it had delayed in 
light of production sharing contracts and open offer issues, and then 
finally completed [7]. 
Therefore, the aforementioned propositions would help scholars 
while pursuing future research in cross-border deals, and assist 
policymakers and regulatory authorities while designing/amending 
international investment and tax laws. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Many advanced economies’ researchers, policy makers, and consultants 
suggest that a country’s economic growth not only depends on its 
financial system and financial development, but also induces by its 
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constitutional and legal infrastructure.8 When we ‘lookup’ deeply through 
our ‘lenses’ in counties like India, there is a huge amount of disturbances, 
consequences, litigations, improper policy guidelines, arrogance of 
regulatory system, inefficient bureaucratic administration, unethical 
political power, a land for corruption, allegations, controversies, religion 
wars, and so forth of economic calamities within the system are folded, 
mixed, unbroken and detachable. Moreover, many of the terms used in 
various acts have not been interpreted carefully. For instance, a study 
mentions that “there should be a clear definition of the term “dominant 
position” under the Competition Act, 2002 [60:117]. Further, it is 
necessary to have extra-territorial application of competition law to 
regulate the anti-competitive activities of foreign firms taking place in the 
given country [60]. Therefore, government and policy makers should take 
an immediate call to rewrite and explain the terms that were left in various 
acts. To do so, there must be a high-level investor protection committee, 
which should comprise a group of knowledge and experience persons.  
In this paper, we analyze and discuss the India’s long-time delayed 
cross-border acquisition ‘Vodafone-Hutchison deal’ in the view of 
international taxation and litigation issues with Union of India since 2007. 
A novel finding of our study indicates that a given country’s weak 
regulatory system benefits both the acquirer and the target firm; at the 
same time, this economic behaviour adversely affects its fiscal income or 
budget. Thus, this deal is a ‘share purchase agreement’ between buyer and 
seller that has occurred outside the country; in other words, it is an 
indirect transfer of shares. Therefore, we support apex court’s final 
judgment in favour of Vodafone that the deal has no nexus with territory 
of India. 
Yet, our study has few limitations [66]. We have carefully recorded 
the events of the case and arranged them in chronological order, and then 
it has systematically analyzed in retrospective manner. However, we 
admit the jeopardy that the investigation and discussions of the case might 
be inclined by untrue memories or falsification of data extracted from 
print media and electronic sources. We eventually suggest some areas that 
thirst future investigation, for instance, determinants of foreign 
acquisitions in emerging economies, interview-based case study research 
in pre-merger decision-making process and post-merger integration, and 
impact of policy reforms on corporate restructuring strategies. Conversely, 
our theory and propositions would advance the current IB and institutional 
knowledge. 
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Appendix 
 
Box 1. Time-line of the Vodafone-Hutchison deal 
 Date Description 
ۏ 2006 December 23 Vodafone started negotiations for Hutchison stake in Hutch-Essar Limited (HEL) (a listed entity in India). Of course, Reliance 
Communications was in the bidding race during the same week. 
ࠁ 2007 January 9 Vodafone initiated the due diligence work of Hutchison Whampoa and Hutch-Essar Limited to asses and propose its decision. 
However, by Feb 10, 2007, the bidding for Hutch was in process, and received proposals from various bidders, for example, 
Hinduja’s with Qatar Telecom. 
۸ 2007 February 11 Vodafone International Holdings (VIH), a Netherland-based subsidiary of Vodafone has acquired 100% equity stake of Hutchison 
Telecom International Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of Hutchison Whampoa Limited) in CGP Investments (Holdings) Ltd, 
Caymon Islands. As a result, Vodafone has become the joint partner in Indian-based HEL, for US$11.2 billion (this value was printed 
in different print-media–news papers). Therefore, the new joint venture would be Vodafone-Essar Limited (now, Vodafone India 
Limited). 
ࠁ 2007 March 15 Vodafone and Essar reached an agreement on jointly managing the HEL. 
◊ 2007 May 5 Vodafone-Hutch deal gets approval from India's Finance Minister. In particular, between March 16, 2007 and Many 5, 2007, the deal 
was scrutinized by FIPB, and other regulated bodies.  
܍ 2008 December 3 Bombay High Court ((BHC), a state-level jurisdiction of Maharastra located in Mumbai) permitted the tax authorities to investigate 
whether the deal is liable for capital gains tax in India. 
ܐ 2010 May The tax authorities issued an order of holding that they had the necessary jurisdiction to proceed against Vodafone. Then, Vodafone 
filed a writ petition before the BHC objecting the tax authorities’ action, and stating that the transaction had no nexus with the 
territory of India. 
ܑ 2010 September 8 BHC has dismissed the petition by stating that the diverse rights and entitlements acquired by Vodafone had sufficient connection 
with the territory of India. 
܏ 2010 September–
October 
Contending the BHC's judgment, Vodafone filed a writ petition in the apex court "Supreme Court of India" (SC). 
ݰ 2010 November 15 SC asked VIH to deposit Rs 2.5 billion; thus, the amount is merely to safeguard the interest of the tax department until the court 
makes the final judgment. 
Т 2010 – 2011 During this period, several rounds and discussions have been taken place between Vodafone and Union of India in the apex court. 
ݪ 2012 January 12 Finally, SC has given its judgment in favour of Vodafone. Thus, SC has disagreed with the conclusions arrived at the BHC, and 
stating that “tax authorities has no territorial tax jurisdiction to tax the offshore transaction, and then directed the tax authorities to 
return the Rs 2.5 billion deposited by the Vodafone with 4 per cent interest within two months, and the bank guarantee of Rs 8.5 
billion submitted at the SC registry within four weeks. 
Source: Authors organized’ based on information collected from authenticated sources [49,54,55,56,57,64,68,69]. 
Notes: We have no case description for the year 2009.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Theory testing and case illustrations 
Theory and its description Theory testing/Case illustrations 
Theory of Foreign Direct Investment [63,70,71; IMF; UNCTAD]. 
 
In Hymer’s view, key motive behind FDI is to gain control over marketing facilities in order 
to facilitate the spread of their products [63:445]. More specifically, Caves indicates that 
there are two important economic features of FDI: (i) it ordinarily affects a net transfer of real 
capital from one country to another; and (ii) it represents entry into a national industry by a 
firm established in overseas market. According to IMF, “FDI enterprise is an enterprise 
(institutional unit) in the financial or non-financial corporate sectors of the economy in which 
a non-resident investor owns 10% or more of the voting power of an incorporated enterprise 
or has the equivalent ownership in an enterprise operating under another legal structure”.  
Vodafone Group Plc has an offshore subsidiary ‘VIH’ located in the 
Netherlands. On the other hand, HWL has an on-shore Asian subsidiary 
firm ‘HTIL’ headquartered in Hong Kong; thus, HTIL has 100% equity 
stake in CGP Investments. The key point is that CGP owns a 51.95% 
indirect shareholding in HEL (an Indian-listed entity). According to FDI 
theory, Vodafone buys a HTIL’s holdings in CGP Investments through its 
subsidiary firm VIH for US$10.9 billion. We therefore suggest that this 
equity acquisition has satisfied the views of Hymer and Caves and the 
IMF. 
Eclectic Paradigm, OLI framework, or International Production Theory [31]. 
 
Dunning suggests that a firm must possess Ownership advantages, Location synergies, and 
Internalization (OLI) within its activities or structures while making it internationalization. 
For instance, the condition for international production is that it must be in the best interest of 
firms that possess ownership-specific advantages to transfer them across national boundaries 
within their own organizations rather than sell them [31: 3]. 
Because of acquisition, Vodafone has become the major partner by 51.95% 
equity holdings in the Indian-based joint venture Hutchison-Essar (HEL). 
Further, it has acquired an additional 22% equity stake from its joint 
venture partner Essar Group. From the post-acquisition decision, we 
strongly believe that Vodafone can experience the market scope with their 
service differentiation. Thus, it is an accomplishment of market seeking 
motive thus meets the criteria of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. 
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Uppsala Theory of Firm Internationalization [72,73,74]. 
 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul presume that the firm first develops in the local markets and 
that the internationalization is the consequence of a series of incremental decisions [72:306]. 
Hence, obstacles such as knowledge and resources can be declined through incremental 
decision-making and learning about the overseas markets. While the revised model depicts 
dynamic, cumulative processes of learning, as well as trust and commitment building 
[74:1424].   
Vodafone is not new in internationalizing their operations, for instance, the 
company’s global presence in terms of number of markets has increased 
dramatically at three-fold from 12 in 1998 to 38 in 2007, and thereafter, 
augmented to 40 in 2011. According to theory, the company has entered 
across the developed and developing economies through incremental 
decision-making. As of the deal that would help the company for further 
diversification in other South Asian and East Asian countries.      
Liability of Foreignness–LoF [63,65,70,71,75,76,77,78]. 
  
Originally, in his doctoral thesis [1960] at MIT, Hymer introduced this concept [71]. In his 
view, LOF is composed of three factors: exchange risk of operating businesses in foreign 
countries, local authorities’ discrimination against foreign companies, and unfamiliarity with 
local business conditions [76:342]. He termed the same as ‘costs of doing business abroad’. 
In fact, it has been pointed out in Coase’s work that foreign firms experience greater 
transaction costs compared to local firms because of foreignness [75]. In the modern era, 
Zaheer argues that LOF could arise at least from four routes: [i] costs directly associated with 
spatial distance, [ii] specific costs based on a particular company’s unfamiliarity (or, 
newness), [iii] costs resulting from the host country environment, and [iv] cost from the home 
country environment [65:343].  
Unfortunately, most LOF studies examine MNEs and its subsidiaries 
performance during the post-setup of units in a given economy and 
compare those results with local firms. Unlike these studies, our case 
shows the legitimate evidence at the foreign market entry-level especially 
in developing economies. Thus, Vodafone has faced various government 
allegations at two jurisdictions, namely BHC (a state-level jurisdiction) and 
SC (apex court of a given country). During these five years (2007-2011, 
Vodafone might have spent at least two per cent of the deal amount, which 
is an additional transaction cost to the company. Briefly, we agree with the 
propositions of LOF suggested by Hymer, Coase, Caves and Zaheer.         
Institutional Theory [79,80,81,82,83]. 
  
The action system is imbedded in an institutional matrix, in two forms: formal structure of 
delegation and control, and formal system and the social structure [79:25]. In [80:341–351], 
the authors suggest that firms that reflect institutional rules tend to buffer their formal 
structures from the uncertainties of technical activities […]. Further, institutional rules may 
affect organizational structures and their implementation […]; thus, relationships that 
compose and surround a given organization. Briefly, institutional isomorphism promotes the 
success and survival of organizations … [81:153]. In others view, for instance, organizations 
are said to be legitimate to the extent that its means and ends appear to conform to social 
norms, values, and expectations [82:177]. It also argues that institutionalization is a process 
that works through all three pillars—cognitive, normative, and regulative—and that this 
process can legitimize a host market for foreign investors [83].  
While testing this theory, most previous studies do not reveal the 
conclusions or findings at foreign market entry level, especially cross-
border mergers/acquisitions. In fact, previous scholars investigate the given 
sample from the ‘firm’s view-point’, but not from the ‘nation’s 
perspective’. On the one hand, we agree that Indian institutional 
framework is rigid, complexity, controversy and frustrated bureaucratic 
capital and unethical political behaviour. However, this theory does not 
explain whether these institutional behaviours affect the given economy’s 
fiscal revenue or budget. Thus, our theory (Farmers Fox) explains this 
important dichotomy that how a weak regulatory system benefits both the 
acquirer and target firm in the given economy international transactions, 
for instance, FDIs and CB-M&As.    
Information Asymmetry Theory [84,85]. 
 
This theory reveals that at least one party (possibly, a buyer) has relevant or better 
information compared to other party (possibly, a seller) in transactions where one presumes 
to surrender and other presumes to receive. Further, it creates an act of imbalance in a given 
transaction, therefore it may go wrong, delay, or failure. It also suggests that social and 
private returns differ, and in some cases, governmental intervention may amplify the welfare 
of all parties, or private institutions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in 
welfare that can accrue to all parties [84:488]. 
Vodafone (may be its M&A advisors) has better information on Indian 
constitutional and legal framework compared to government officials 
(revenue department and tax authorities). Thus, this information helps 
Vodafone to win against the counter arguments and penalties put 
forwarded by the tax officials. Finally, SC has delivered its judgment in 
favour of Vodafone stating that “existing book of law does not allow tax 
authorities to impose the capital gains tax on Vodafone-Hutchison deal”.      
 
 
